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Forward utilities and Mean-field games under
relative performance concerns∗
Gonc¸alo dos Reis † and Vadim Platonov
Abstract We introduce the concept of mean field games for agents using Forward
utilities to study a family of portfolio management problems under relative per-
formance concerns. Under asset specialization of the fund managers, we solve the
forward-utility finite player game and the forward-utilitymean-field game.We study
best response and equilibrium strategies in the single common stock asset and the
asset specialization with common noise. As an application, we draw on the core
features of the forward utility paradigm and discuss a problem of time-consistent
mean-field dynamic model selection in sequential time-horizons.
Key words: Forward utility, Mean-Field Games, social interactions, performance
concerns.
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1 Introduction
This work focuses on bringing the concept of forward utilities to the mean-field
game setting in the limelight of competitive optimal portfolio management of agents
under relative performance criteria and the analysis of the associated finite-player
game.
There exists a very rich literature on portfolio management for agents with utility
preferences and under performance concerns to which this short introduction cannot
possibly due justice. For a literature perspective of the financial setting including an
in-depth discussion of agents with performance concerns and its impact in the utility
maximization frameworkwe refer to [13, 14, 5] and references therein. Additionally,
we point the reader to the beautiful introductions of [19, 18] where those concepts
are brought to the framework of mean-field games. Further, those works also make
for an excellent review of mean-field games in the context of the Merton problem
which is the framework underlying our work.
In short, mean-field games (MFG), stochastic or not, gained renewed interest due
to their modelling power in crucially reducing the dimensionality of the underlying
problem under the assumption of statistically equivalent populations [17, 6, 7]. In
other words, as long as the actions of a single agent do not affect the average inter-
action of the agents in their whole, then, in principle, the MFG framework stands to
be more tractable than the n-agent games. See [19, 18].
The novelty of our work is the conceptualization and analysis, simplified here,
of the formulation of mean-field games within the so-called forward utilities frame-
work. Further, we juxtapose our construction to the related finite-player game.
The classical and ubiquitous approach of utility preferences, found throughout
the literature ([13, 14, 5]), is that each agent, at an initial-time, specifies their risk-
preferences to some future time T and proceeds to optimize their investment to that
initial-time. This backward approach lacks flexibility to handle mid-time changes
of risk-preferences by the agents, or, to allow an update of the underlying model:
having in mind Covid-19, if the fund manager made investments in early 2019 to
mature in the later part of 2020, how would one update the underlying model stock
model to the change of parameters?
These problems feature an inherently forward-in-time nature of investment. A
view that is particularly clear for (competitive) fund managers updating their in-
vestment preferences frequently depending on market behavior. To cope with the
limitation of the backward-in-time view induced by the classical utility optimiza-
tion formulation, and, to better address this forward view, the mathematical tool
of forward utilities was developed. It was initially introduced for the analysis of the
portfoliomanagement problems in [20, 21, 22] and subsequently expanded [25, 2, 8]
and [12, 10, 11]. The latter dealing with general forward utility Itoˆ randomfields and
with applications to longevity risk. An excellent literature review on the theme of
forward utilities is the recent work [3].
In essence, the concept of forward utility reflects that the utility map must be
adaptive and adjusted to the information flow. The forward dynamic utility map is
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built to be consistent with respect to the given investment universe and the approach
we discuss here is based on the martingale optimality principle (see Section 2.1).
To the MFG context, the closest to our work we have found is the concept of
Forward-Forward MFG concept of [16, 1].
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce the financial market. In
Sections 3 and 4 we study the finite-agent and mean-field game respectively. We
study forward utilities of time-monotone type. In section 4.4 we discuss the mean-
field investment problem with dynamic model selection in large time-horizons. We
conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of open questions and future research.
2 Asset specialization, Forward utilities and CARA preferences
The market.We consider a market environment with one riskless asset and n risky
securities which serve as proxies for two distinct asset classes. We assume their
prices to be of log-normal type, each driven by two independent Brownian motions.
More precisely the price (Sit)t>0 of the stock i traded by the i-th agent solves
dSit
Sit
= µidt+νidW
i
t +σidBt , (1)
with constant parameters µ i > 0, σi > 0 and νi > 0 with σi + νi > 0. The one-
dimensional standard Brownian motionsB,W 1, · · · ,W n are independent.When σi >
0, the process B induces a correlation between the stocks, and thus we call B the
common noise andW i an idiosyncratic noise. The independent Brownian motions
B,W 1, · · · ,W n are defined on a probability space (Ω ,F,F ,P) endowed with the
natural filtration F= (Ft )t>0 generated by them and satisfies the usual conditions.
We recall the case of single common stock, where ∀i = 1, . . . ,n, (µi,σi) =
(µ ,σ), νi = 0, for some µ ,σ > 0 and independent of i. The single common stock
case has been explored in great generality in [13, 14, 5] incorporating portfolio con-
straints, general stock price dynamics and risk-sharing mechanisms.
Agents’ wealth. Each agent i = 1, . . . ,n trades using a self-financing strategy,
(pi it )t>0, which represent the (discounted by the bond) amount invested in the i-th
stock. The ith agent’s wealth (X it )t>0 then solves
dX it = pi
i
t
(
µidt+νidW
i
t +σidBt
)
, with X i0 = x
i
0 ∈R. (2)
A portfolio strategy is said admissible if it belongs to the set A i, which consists of
A
i =
{
pi i : F-progressively measurable R-valued processes (pi it )t>0,
and self-financing such that E[
∫ t
0
|pis|
2ds]< ∞, ∀t > 0
}
.
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The Agents’ social interaction. Each manager measures the performance of her
strategy taking into account the policy of the other. Each agent engages in a form
of social interaction that affects that agent’s perception of wealth, all in an additive
fashion modeled through the arithmetic average wealth of all agents (this model
is largely inspired in [13, 14, 5, 19]). Namely the relative performance metric of
manager i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, denoted X˜ i is defined to be
X˜ i = X i−θiX , where X :=
1
n
n
∑
k=1
X k and θi ∈ [0,1]. (3)
We easily obtain a dynamics for X and X˜ i, namely
X t =
(1
n
n
∑
k=1
xk0
)
+
(1
n
n
∑
k=1
pikt µk
)
dt+
(1
n
n
∑
k=1
pikt νkdW
k
t
)
+
(1
n
n
∑
k=1
pikt σk
)
dBt
= x0+(piµ)tdt+
(1
n
n
∑
k=1
pikt νkdW
k
t
)
+(piσ)tdBt ,
X˜ it =
(
xi0−θix0
)
+
(
pi it µi−θi(piµ)t
)
dt
+
(
pi itνidW
i
t −θi
(1
n
n
∑
k=1
pikt νkdW
k
t
))
+
(
pi itσi−θi(piσ)t
)
dBt , (4)
where x0, piµ and piσ are identified as averages (as seen from the 1st equation to the
2nd). Similarly to [19, Remark 2.5], it is natural to replace the average wealth X in
(3) by the average over all other agents. With that in mind we define for convenience
X
(−i)
= 1
n−1 ∑k 6=iX
k and Y (−i) = n
n−1X
(−i)
. This leads us to recast (3) as
X̂ i = X i−θiX
(−i)
, where X
(−i)
=
1
n− 1 ∑
k 6=i
X k. (5)
We easily obtain a dynamics for X̂ and X
(−i)
, namely
X
(−i)
t = x
(−i)
0 +(piµ)
(−i)
t dt+
( 1
n− 1 ∑
k 6=i
pikt νkdW
k
t
)
+(piσ)
(−i)
t dBt ,
X̂ it =
(
xi0−θix
(−i)
0
)
+
(
pi it µi−θi(piµ)
(−i)
t
)
dt
+
(
pi itνidW
i
t −θi
( 1
n− 1
n
∑
k 6=i
pikt νkdW
k
t
))
+
(
pi itσi−θi(piσ)
(−i)
t
)
dBt . (6)
We also define the quantities
piσ
(−i)
:=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
pikσk, (piµ)
(−i)
:=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
pikµk and (piν)2
(−i)
:=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
(pikνk)
2,
where we have the following relations between piσ
(−i)
, piσ (−i) and piσ :
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piσ (−i) =
n
n− 1
piσ −
1
n− 1
pi iσi, piσ
(−i) =
n
n− 1
piσ
(−i)
, (7)
and piσ
(−i)
= piσ − 1
n
pi iσi. We do not write it explicitly but we extend the same
notation and relations to piµ
(−i)
, piµ(−i) and piµ.
2.1 Forward dynamic utilities (classic)
We recall, for reference, the classic forward utility formulation.We define a forward
dynamic utilities in the context of the probability space (Ω ,F,F ,P). We denote by
u0 :R→R the initial data. The forward utility is constructed based on the martingale
optimality principle.
Definition 1 (Forward dynamic utilities). Let U : Ω ×R× [0,∞)→ R be an F-
progressively measurable random field.U is a forward dynamic utility if:
• For all t > 0 the map x 7→U(x, t) is increasing and concave;
• It satisfiesU(x,0) = u0(x);
• For all T > t and each self-financing strategy, represented by pi , the associated
discounted wealth process Xpi satisfies a supermartingale property
E[U(XpiT ,T )|Ft ]6U(X
pi
t , t);
• For all T > t there exists a self financing strategy, represented by pi∗, for which
the associated discounted wealth X∗ satisfies a martingale property
E[U(X∗T ,T )|Ft ] =U(X
∗
t , t).
The above definition assumes the optimizer is attained. This is a somewhat strong
assumption which is discussed in [25, 2]. There it is argued that such constraint is
not necessary for the forward utility construction in certain contexts.
3 Forward relative performance criteria
3.1 Forward relative performance criteria
Each manager measures the output of her relative performance metric using a for-
ward relative one as modeled by an Ft -progressively measurable random field
U i : R× [0,∞)→ R for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. The below criteria is a variant of the orig-
inal one as proposed by [24] (also [3]).
The main idea here being a formulation inspired in the first step in the usual
strategy of solving a Nash game, namely the best response of an agent to the actions
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of all other agents. Take manager i and assume all other agents j 6= i have acted
with an investment policy pi j then for any strategy pi i ∈ A i, the processU i(X̂ it , t) is
a (local) supermartingale, and there exists pi i,∗ ∈A i such thatU i(X̂ i,∗t , t) is a (local)
martingale where X̂ i and X̂ i,∗ solves (5) with strategies pi i and pi i,∗ respectively.
This version of a relative criterion is (implicitly and) exogenously parametrized
by the policies of all other managers j 6= i over which there is no assumption on
their optimality. In Nash-game language, we solve the so-called best response.
Definition 2 (Forward relative performance for the manager). Each manager i ∈
{1, · · · ,n} satisfies the following. Let pi j ∈ A j, ∀ j 6= i be arbitrary but fixed and
admissible policies for the other managers j 6= i.
An F-progressively measurable random field U i(x, t) is a forward relative per-
formance for manager i if, for all t > 0, the following conditions hold:
i) The mapping x 7→U i(x, t), is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
ii) For pi i ∈ A i, U i(X̂ it , t) is a local supermartingale and X̂
i is the relative perfor-
mance metric given in (5);
iii) There exists pi i,∗ ∈ A i such that U i(X̂ i,∗t , t) is a (local) martingale where X̂
i,∗
solves (5) with strategies pi i,∗ being used.
In the above definition, we do not make explicit references to the initial conditions
Uk(x,0) but we assume that admissible initial data exist such that the above defini-
tion is viable. Contrary to the classical expected utility case, the forward volatility
process is an investor-specific input. Once it is chosen, the supermartingality and
martingality properties impose conditions on the drift of the process. Under enough
regularity, these conditions lead to the forward performance SPDE (see [24]).
Since we are working in a log-normal market, it suffices to study smooth relative
performance criteria of zero volatility (of the forward utility map). Such processes
are extensively analyzed in [23] in the absence of relative performance concerns.
There, a concise characterization of the forward criteria is given along (necessary
and sufficient) conditions for their existence and uniqueness. In that setting, the
zero-volatility forward processes are always time-decreasing processes. However,
this is not the case when relative performance is argued in [3].
We assume that the Itoˆ decomposition of the forward utility map is
dU i(x, t) =U it (x, t)dt, for i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, (8)
and the derivativesU it (x, t),U
i
x(x, t) andU
i
xx(x, t) exists for t > 0. And we next derive
a stochastic PDE and an optimal investment strategy for a smooth relative perfor-
mance criteria of zero volatility of some agent i assuming that all other agents j 6= i
have made their investment decisions.
Proposition 1 (Best responses). Fix i∈ {1, · · · ,n} and the agent’s initial preference
ui0. Assume that each manager j 6= i follows pi
j ∈A j. Consider the stochastic PDE
for (x, t) ∈R× [0,∞)
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U it =
(
θi(piµ)
(−i)
t −
µiθiσi(piσ)
(−i)
t
ν2i +σ
2
i
)
U ix+
µ2i
2(ν2i +σ
2
i )
(U ix)
2
U ixx
+
1
2
U ixx
[(
θi(piσ)
(−i)
t
)2( σ2i
ν2i +σ
2
i
− 1
)
−
θ 2i
n− 1
(piν)2
(−i)
]
, (9)
and assume that for an admissible initial conditionU(·,0) = ui0(·), the SPDE has a
smooth solutionU i such that x 7→U i(x, t) is strictly increasing (Ux > 0) and strictly
concave (Uxx < 0) for each t > 0.
Define the strategy pi i,∗
pi i,∗t =
1
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
θiσi(piσ)
(−i)
t − µi
U ix(X̂
i,∗
t , t)
U ixx(X̂
i,∗
t , t)
)
, t > 0,
where X̂ i,∗ solves (6) with pi i,∗ being used.
If pi i,∗ ∈ A i and X̂ i,∗ are well-defined, then U i(x, t) is a forward utility perfor-
mance process. Moreover, the policy pi i,∗ is optimal (in the sense of Definition 2).
Using the language of [22, Section 5], define the local risk tolerance function
ri : Ω ×R× [0,∞) → R such that ri(x, t) := −U ix(x, t)/U
i
xx(x, t). Then, by direct
inspection of the expression for I pi i,∗ one sees that if the local risk tolerance func-
tion ri(x, t) = ri =Const ∀t > 0 (e.g. CARA utilities) then the optimal strategy will
be constant throughout time if additionally all other agents also choose a constant
strategy.
Corollary 1 (Constant strategies under CARA). Assume that all agents j 6= i in-
vest according to constant strategies α j ∈ R and that the local risk tolerance func-
tion ri is constant. Then pi i,∗ is constant.
We now prove the previous “best responses” proposition above.
Proof (Proof of Proposition 1). From (5) we have the dynamics of dX̂ i (and hence
that of d(X i − θiX
(−i)
)). We now apply the Itoˆ formula to U i(X̂ it , t) = U
i(X it −
θiX
(−i)
t , t),
dU i(X̂ it , t) =U
i
t (X̂
i
t , t)dt+U
i
x(X̂
i
t , t)dX̂
i
t +
1
2
U ixx(X̂
i
t , t)d〈X̂
i
t 〉
=U it (X̂
i
t , t)dt+U
i
x(X̂
i
t , t)
(
pi it µi−θi(piµ)
(−i)
t
)
dt
+U ix(X̂
i
t , t)
(
pi itνidW
i
t −θi
( 1
n− 1
n
∑
k 6=i
pikt νkdW
k
t
))
(10)
+U ix(X̂
i
t , t)
(
pi itσi−θi(piσ)
(−i)
t
)
dBt
+
1
2
U ixx(X̂
i
t , t)
[
(pi itνi)
2+
θ 2i
n− 1
(piν)2
(−i)
+
(
pi itσi−θi(piσ)
(−i)
t
)2]
dt,
withU i(X̂ i0,0) =U
i(xi0−θix
(−i)
0 ,0) and we used that the B,W
j are all i.i.d.
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By Definition 2, the process U i(X̂ it , t) becomes a Martingale at the optimum pi .
Direct computations using first order conditions (∂pi i“drift”= 0) yield
0+U ix
(
µi− 0
)
+
1
2
U ixx
[
2pi iν2i + 0+ 2
(
pi itσi−θi(piσ)
(−i)
t
)
σi
]
= 0
⇔ U ixxpi
i(ν2i +σ
2
i ) =−U
i
xµi+U
i
xxθiσi(piσ)
(−i)
t (11)
⇒ pi it =
1
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
θiσi(piσ)
(−i)
t − µi
U ix(X̂
i
t , t)
U ixx(X̂
i
t , t)
)
.
Injecting the expression of pi it in the drift term of (10) and simplifying we arrive at
the consistency condition (9), we do not carry out this step explicitly, nonetheless,
using that U i solves (9) equation (10) simplifies to (exact calculations are carried
out in the Section 6)
dU i(X̂ it , t)
=U ix(X̂
i
t , t)
(
pi itνidW
i
t −θi
( 1
n− 1
n
∑
k 6=i
pikt νkdW
k
t
))
+U ix(X̂
i
t , t)
(
pi itσi−θi(piσ)
(−i)
t
)
dBt
+
1
2
U ixx(X̂
i
t , t)
1
ν2i +σ
2
i
∣∣∣pi i(ν2i +σ2i )−(θiσi(piσ)(−i)t − µi U ix(X̂ it , t)
U ixx(X̂
i
t , t)
)∣∣∣2dt. (12)
The concavity assumption ofU i(x, t) implies that the drift term above is non-positive
and vanishes when (11) holds. We can conclude that, if pi i,∗t = pi
i
t ∈A
i and the asso-
ciated process X̂ i,∗ is well-defined (solution to (6) with pi i,∗), the processU i(X̂ i,∗t , t)
is a local-martingale, otherwise it is a local supermartingale. The result concludes.
3.1.1 Examples: CARA case
Example 1 (The classic CARA case - exponential case). The exponential criterion
takes as initial condition the mapU(x,0) (x ∈ R) defined as
U i(x,0) =−e−x/δ , with δ > 0. (13)
In this case, the local risk tolerance function r =−U ix/U
i
xx = δ .
In our case accounting for social interaction between agents in the form of per-
formance concerns, the i-th agent’s utility is a functionU i : Ω ×R×R× [0,∞)→R
of both her individual wealth x and the average wealth wealth of all agents, m. The
initial/starting utility map is of the form
U i(x,m,0) =−exp
{
−
1
δi
(x−θim)
}
,
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where we refer to the constants δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0,1] as personal risk tolerance and
competition weight parameters, respectively.
Example 2 (The time-monotone forward utility with starting exponential). For i ∈
{1, · · · ,n}, let the dynamics of U i be given by (8) and assume U i(x,0) = −e−ηx
with η > 0. Then the solution to the SPDE (9) is given by
U i(x, t) =−e
− x
δi
+ fi(t), with δi > 0, (14)
where ( fi(t))t>0 is the randommap given below independent of x satisfying fi(0) =
0, sufficiently integrable and t 7→ fi(t) is differentiable. Note that in this case, the
local risk tolerance function satisfies ri =−U ix/U
i
xx = δi.
InjectingU i(x, t) above in (9) yields an ODE for fi (we omit the time variable),
f ′i =−
θi
δi
(
(piµ)
(−i)
−
µiσi(piσ)
(−i)
ν2i +σ
2
i
)
+
µ2i
2(ν2i +σ
2
i )
+
θ 2i
2δ 2i
[(
(piσ)
(−i)
)2( σ2i
ν2i +σ
2
i
− 1
)
−
1
n− 1
(piν)2
(−i)
]
=−
θi
δi
(piµ)
(−i)
+
1
2(ν2i +σ
2
i )
(
µi+
θi
δi
σi(piσ)
(−i)
)2
−
θ 2i
2δ 2i
[(
(piσ)
(−i)
t
)2
+
1
n− 1
(piν)2
(−i)
]
=: λi.
Hence, fi(t) =
∫ t
0 λi(s)ds. In particular, if all coefficients and strategies are con-
stant, then (with a slight abuse of notation) fi(t) = tλi for a constant λi given by the
RHS of the above ODE.
Example 3 (No performance concerns: θ i= 0).We continue to work under the time-
monotone forward utility case of the previous example. Without performance con-
cerns, i.e. θi = 0, then λi is just the Sharpe ratio λi =
µ2i
2(ν2i +σ
2
i )
and we recover known
results. We have from Proposition 1 that
pi i,∗· =
µiδi
ν2i +σ
2
i
and U i(x, t) =−exp
{
−
x
δi
+ tλ
(θi=0)
i
}
,
with the constant λ
(θi=0)
i just being the Sharpe ratio, λ
(θi=0)
i =
µ2i
2(ν2i +σ
2
i )
.
3.2 The Forward Nash equilibrium
In view of the best responses discussed in Proposition 1 we now investigate the
simultaneous best responses as to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 3 (Forward Nash equilibrium). A forward Nash equilibrium consists
of n-pairs of Ft -adapted maps (U
i,pi i,∗) such that for any t > 0 the following con-
ditions hold.
• ∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, pi i,∗ ∈A i;
• For each player i ∈ {1, · · · ,n} the following holds: given the strategies pi j,∗ ∈
A j (any j 6= i) the processes U i(X̂ it (pi
∗,−i), t) is a local supermartingale where
X̂ i(pi∗,−i) solves (6) with all managers j 6= i acting according to pi j,∗;
• For each player i ∈ {1, · · · ,n} the following holds: the processU i(X̂ i,∗t (pi
∗,−i), t)
is a local martingale where X̂ i(pi∗,−i) solves (6) with all managers j acting ac-
cording to pi j,∗.
If all the optimal strategies are constant we say we have a constant forward Nash
equilibrium.
Under appropriate integrability conditions plus the martingale/supermartingalechar-
acterizations, we have for some agent i for any pi i ∈A i
E[U i(X̂ i,∗t (pi
∗,−i), t)] = E[U i(X̂ i,∗0 (pi
∗,−i),0)]
= E[U i(xi0−θix
(−i)
0 ,0)]
=U i(xi0−θix
(−i)
0 ,0)> E[U
i(X̂ it (pi
∗,−i), t)].
As expected, no manager can increase the expected utility of her relative perfor-
mance metric by unilateral decision.
The solvability of the general forward Nash equilibrium seems very difficult for
a general forward criteria as one needs to solve the following system for the pi i,∗
(see Proposition 1, in particular (11)) and the corresponding SPDEs for the U i, i ∈
{1, · · · ,n}:
pi i,∗t (ν
2
i +σ
2
i ) = θiσi
( 1
n− 1
n
∑
k=1,k 6=i
pik,∗t σk
)
− µi
U ix
(
X̂
i,∗
t (pi
∗,−i), t
)
U ixx
(
X̂
i,∗
t (pi
∗,−i), t
) . (15)
3.2.1 Equilibrium with time-monotone forward utilities and exponential
initial condition
In order to obtain explicit results we focus on the time-monotone case presented in
Example 2 for which U ix/U
i
xx = −δi. More notably, at the level at which we have
formulated our problem we can easily recover the results of [19, Theorem 2.3] for
which one hasU ix/U
i
xx =−δi ∀t (note their Remark 2.5).
Theorem 1. Assume the conditions of Proposition 1 hold for all agents i∈{1, · · · ,n}.
Assume furthermore that agents have time-monotone forward utility U i with initial
condition (13).
Define the quantities ϕσn and ψ
σ
n by
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ϕσn :=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
δi
µiσi
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
1+ θi
n−1
) and ψσn := 1n− 1 n∑
i=1
θi
σ2i
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
1+ θi
n−1
) .
(16)
Then, if ψσn 6= 1 then a constant forward Nash equilibrium exists, with the constant
optimal strategies pi i,∗ given by
pi i,∗· =
1
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
1+ θi
n−1
)(θiσi(1+ 1
n− 1
) ϕσn
1−ψσn
+ µiδi
)
. (17)
The forward Nash equilibria is given by the n-pairs {(U i,∗,pi i,∗)}i=1,··· ,n where the
U i,∗ is the solution of (9) (see Example 2) under the optimal constant strategies pi ·,∗.
The term λi (see Example 2), at equilibrium, is given by
λi =−
θi
δi
({ n
n− 1
piµ −
1
n− 1
pi iµi
}
−
µiσi
ν2i +σ
2
i
{ n
n− 1
piσ −
1
n− 1
pi iσi
})
+
µ2i
2(ν2i +σ
2
i )
+
θ 2i
2δ 2i
[{ n
n− 1
piσ −
1
n− 1
pi iσi
}2( σ2i
ν2i +σ
2
i
− 1
)
−
{ n
(n− 1)2
(piν)2−
1
(n− 1)2
(pi iνi)
2
}]
,
where the relevant expressions for piσ , piµ and (piν)2 are given below in (18), (19)
and (20).
Remark 1. We note that we solve not the same problem studied at [19], but an equiv-
alent one. However imposing the scaling factor given by [19, Remark 2.5] we re-
cover the same results as in [19, Theorem 2.3].
Proof. Injecting the condition Ux/Uxx = −δi in (15), the system to be solved in
order to ascertain the Nash equilibrium is, across i ∈ {1, · · · ,n},
pi i,∗t (ν
2
i +σ
2
i ) = θiσi
( 1
n− 1
n
∑
k=1,k 6=i
pik,∗t σk
)
+ µiδi
= θiσi
( n
n− 1
(piσ)t −
1
n− 1
pi i,∗σi
)
+ µiδi
⇔ pi i,∗t =
1
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
1+ θi
n−1
)(θiσi n
n− 1
(piσ)t + µiδi
)
.
The final line yields the expression for pi i,∗ as a function of the unknown piσ . To
determine the latter, multiply both sides by σi and average over i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, this
yields a solvability condition
(piσ)t = (piσ)tψ
σ
n +ϕ
σ
n ⇔ piσ =
ϕσn
1−ψσn
as long as ψσn 6= 1. (18)
12 Gonc¸alo dos Reis and Vadim Platonov
Plugging the expression (piσ) in that for pi i,∗ yields the result. That the optimal
strategies are constant is now obvious.
It remains to derive the expression for the λi’s. Just like for piσ , we obtain an
expression for piµ by multiplying pi i,∗ by µi and averaging on both sides, we have
piµ =
n
n− 1
·
ϕσn
1−ψσn
·ψ µn +φ
µ
n and piµ
(−i) =
n
n− 1
piµ −
1
n− 1
pi iµi, (19)
where we used (7) and the quantities ϕ
µ
n ,ψ
µ
n are defined as
ϕµn :=
1
n
n
∑
k=1
δk
µ2k
ν2k +σ
2
k (1+
θk
n−1)
and ψ µn :=
1
n
n
∑
k=1
θk
µkσk
ν2k +σ
2
k (1+
θk
n−1)
.
Similarly, defining (piν)2 := 1
n−1 ∑k 6=i(pi
k
t νk)
2 we have
(piν)2 =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(νiθiσi · nn−1 · ϕσn1−ψσn +νiµiδi
ν2i +σ
2
i
(
1+ θi
n−1
) )2. (20)
Similarly to (7), we have (piν)2
(−i)
= n
n−1(piν)
2− 1
n−1(pi
iνi)
2. Replacing these ex-
pressions in that for λi in Example 2 the expression in the result’s statement follows.
From the forward utility machinery one can easily recover the classical case of
utility optimization where one prescribes the utility map for the horizon time T then
proceeds to optimize.
Example 4 (Recovering the classical utility problem from the forward one.). If one
would start the forward utility with (for some 0< T < ∞)
ui0(x) :=−e
−x/δi−Tλi ,
then computations like those presented yield the forward utility mapU(x, t) as
U i(x, t) =−e−x/δi+(t−T )λi , t ∈ [0,T ]
and in particularU(x,T ) = −e−x/δi . In other words, our forward utility recovers as
a particular case the classical exponential utility maximization problem (discussed
in [19]).
Corollary 2 (Single stock). Let µi = µ > 0, σi = σ > 0 and νi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . .n.
Defining constants as
ϕσn :=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
δi
1+ θi
n−1
and ψσn :=
1
n− 1
n
∑
i=1
θi
1+ θi
n−1
. (21)
Then, if ψσn 6= 1 then a constant forward Nash equilibrium exists, with the constant
optimal strategies pi i,∗ given by
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pi i,∗· =
µ
σ2
(
1+ θ
n−1
)(θ(1+ 1
n− 1
) ϕσn
1−ψσn
+ δ
)
.
4 The mean field game
By inspection of Theorem 1 one sees that the optimal strategy and forward utility
map for some agent depend on that agent’s specific parameters (model parameters,
initial wealth, risk tolerance and performance concern) and on certain averages of
the parameters of all agents. This makes a case for a MFG approach to the game.
In this section and inspired by the results in the previous one, we formalize the
concept of forward mean-field Nash game. We use the concept of type distributions
introduced in [17] and [19]. We follow the construction presented in the latter.
We focus on initial forward utilities at time t = 0 that are of exponential type,
U i(x,m,0) =−exp
{
−
1
δi
(x−θim)
}
,
where we refer to the constants δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0,1] as personal risk tolerance and
competition weight parameters, respectively.
For the n-agent game, we define for each agent i= 1, . . . ,n the type vector
ζi := (x
i
0,δi,θi,µi,νi,σi).
These type vectors induce an empirical measure, called the type distribution, which
is the probability measure on the type space
Z
e := R× (0,∞)× [0,1]× (0,∞)× [0,∞)× [0,∞), (22)
given by
mn(A) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
1A(ζi), for Borel sets A⊂Z
e.
Assume now that as the number of agents becomes large, n→∞, the above empirical
measure mn has a weak limit m, in the sense that
∫
Z e
f dmn →
∫
Z e
f dm for every
bounded continuous function f on Z e. For example, this holds almost surely if the
ζi’s are i.i.d. samples from m. Let ζ = (ξ ,δ ,θ ,µ ,ν,σ) denote a random variable
with this limiting distribution m.
Themean field game (MFG) defined next allows us to derive the limiting strategy
as the outcome of a self-contained equilibrium problem, which intuitively represents
a game with a continuum of agents with type distribution m. Rather than directly
modeling a continuum of agents, we follow the MFG paradigm of modeling a sin-
gle representative agent, who we view as randomly selected from the population.
The probability measure m represents the distribution of type parameters among the
continuum of agents; equivalently, the representative agent’s type vector is a ran-
dom variable with law m. Heuristically, each agent in the continuum trades in a
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single stock driven by two Brownian motions, one of which is unique to this agent
and one of which is common to all agents. We extend the Forward Nash equilibrium
of Definition 3 to the MFG setting below.
4.1 Agents through type-distribution and the market
To formulate the MFG, we now assume that the probability space (Ω ,F ,P) sup-
ports yet another independent (one-dimensional) Brownian motion,W , as well as a
random variable
ζ = (ξ ,δ ,θ ,µ ,ν,σ),
independent of W and B, and with values in the space Z e defined in (22). This
random variable ζ is called the type vector, and its distribution is called the type
distribution.
Let FMF = (FMFt )t∈[0,T ] denote the smallest filtration satisfying the usual as-
sumptions for which ζ is FMF0 -measurable and bothW and B are adapted. Let also
F
B = (FBt )t∈[0,T ] denote the natural filtration generated by the Brownian motion B.
The generic agent’s wealth process solves
dXt = pit(µdt+νdWt +σdBt), X0 = ξ , (23)
where the portfolio strategy must belong to the admissible set AMF of self-financing
F
MF-progressively measurable real-valued processes (pit)t>0 satisfying the square-
integrability condition E[
∫ T
0 |pit |
2dt] < ∞ for any T ∈ [0,∞). The random variable
ξ is the initial wealth of the representative agent, whereas (µ ,ν,σ) are the market
parameters. In the sequel, the parameters δ and θ will affect the risk preferences of
the representative agent. Note that each agent among the continuum may still have
different preference parameters, captured by the fact that δ and θ are random.
4.2 The equilibrium
The formulation of the forward Nash game of Section 3 drives the formulation of the
Mean-field game we discuss here. Recall that in the MFG-formulation the generic
agent has no influence on the average wealth of the continuum of agents, as but
one agent amid a continuum of agents. We next introduce the concept of mean-field
(MF)-forward relative performance, pi∗ is theMF-equilibrium and, the main object
of interest theMF-Forward relative performance equilibrium.
We recall the framework. We assume that the Itoˆ decomposition of the forward
utility map (without noise) is
dU(x, t) =Ut(x, t)dt and initial condition (13),
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where the derivativesUt(x, t),Ux(x, t) andUxx(x, t) exist for t > 0. Given the market
setup we developed so far, we next define our concept of equilibrium.
Definition 4 (MF-Forward relative performance equilibrium (for the generic
manager)). Let pi ∈ A MF and Xpi solving (23) with pi ; to (pi ,Xpi) we associate the
F
B-adapted square integrable stochastic process (X t)t>0, representing the average
wealth of the continuum of agents, as X t := E
P⊗m[Xpit |F
B
t ] for all t > 0.
The FMF-progressively measurable random field (U(x, t))t>0 is a MF-forward
relative performance for the generic manager if, for all t > 0, the following condi-
tions hold:
i) The mapping x 7→U(x, t), is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
ii) For each pi ∈ A MF, U(Xpit − θX t , t) is a P-local supermartingale and X is the
generic agent’s wealth process solving (23) for the strategy pi ;
iii) There exists pi∗ ∈ A MF such thatU(X∗t −θXt , t) is a P-local martingale where
X∗ solves (23) with pi∗ plugged in as the strategy;
iv) We call pi∗ of point iii) a MF-equilibrium if X t = E
P⊗m[X∗t |F
B
t ] for all t > 0
where where X∗ solves (23) with pi∗ plugged in as the strategy.
We denote the triplet (U,pi∗,X) satisfying i)-iv) the MF-Forward relative per-
formance equilibrium. An MF-equilibrium is constant if there exists an FMF0 -
measurable RV pi∗ such that pit = pi
∗, ∀t > 0.
The last point can be understood as a fixed point argument which creates a compat-
ibility condition between the generic agent within the continuum of agents. In fact,
conditionally on the BM B each agent faces an independent noiseW and an inde-
pendent type vector ζ . As in MFG [19], conditionally on B, all agents faces i.i.d.
copies of the same optimization problem. The law of large numbers suggests that
the average terminal wealth of the whole population should be EP⊗m[X∗t |F
B
t ].
Our construction allows us to identify EP⊗m[X∗t |F
B
t ] with a certain dynamics
and, in turn, treat this component as an additional uncontrolled state process. This
avoids altogether the conceptualization of the master equation for models with dif-
ferent types of agents. The latter is left for future research.
4.3 Solving the optimization problem
We now present the main result of this section which is the existence of a MF-
Forward relative performance equilibrium for the generic manager according to
Definition 4 within the context of time-monotone forward utilities.
From the methodological point of view, the problem is solved as before. Apply
Itoˆ-Wentzell toU(Zpit , t), determine the optimal strategy pi
∗ and the consistency con-
dition (the SPDE) forU such that the first three conditions of Definition 4 hold. The
last condition, to show that pi∗ is indeed the MFG Forward equilibrium follows by
construction as we will see.
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Theorem 2. Assume that m-a.s. δ > 0, θ ∈ [0,1], µ > 0, σ > 0, ν > 0 such that
σ2+ν2 > 0.
Assume the following constants are finite
ψσ :=Em
[
θ
σ2
ν2+σ2
]
, ϕσ := Em
[
δ
µσ
ν2+σ2
]
,
ψ µ :=Em
[
θ
µσ
ν2+σ2
]
, ϕµ := Em
[
δ
µ2
ν2+σ2
]
.
Assume that ψσ 6= 1. Then there exists a unique constant MF-Forward relative per-
formance equilibrium in the sense of Definition 4.
The constant MF-equilibrium strategy is given by
pi∗ =
1
ν2+σ2
(
θσ
ϕσ
1−ψσ
+ µδ
)
, (24)
constrained to the identity
E
m[σpi∗] =
ϕσ
1−ψσ
< ∞.
The MF-forward CARA relative performance utility map is the solution of
Ut = θ
( ϕσ
1−ψσ
·ψ µ +ϕµ − µ
σ
ν2+σ2
·
ϕσ
1−ψσ
)
Ux
+
µ2
2(ν2+σ2)
(Ux)
2
Uxx
+
1
2
Uxx ·θ
2
( ϕσ
1−ψσ
)2( σ2
ν2+σ2
− 1
)
. (25)
When the initial condition is U(x,0) = u0(x) = −e
−x/δ , i.e. the exponential prefer-
ences, U is given explicitly by U(x, t) = u0(x)e
tλ with λ given by
λ =−
θ
δ
µα +
1
2(ν2+σ2)
(
µ +
θ
δ
σσα
)2
−
θ 2
2δ 2
(
σα
)2
,
where σα and µα are given by (29) and (30) respectively.
If ψσ = 1, then there exists no constant MF-equilibrium.
By comparing the statements of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 (and same happens
for the respective Single (common) Stock Corollaries) one easily sees that as n→∞
the strategies, weights (φ ·n and ψ
·
n) and forward-utility map in Theorem 1 converge
to the respective quantities appearing in Theorem 2.
Remark 2. In contrast with Remark 1, here we recover the result from [19, Theorem
2.10] as the scaling factors converge to 1 (as n→∞). Hence, due to space constraints
we defer the reader to [19, Section 2.3] for the discussion of the equilibria.
Proof. We proceed in several steps in order to construct the constantMF-equilibrium.
To that end we must solve ii)-iii) in Definition 4 for a given X process associated to
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pi ∈ AMF. Condition iv), for MF-equilibrium allows us to focus only on processes
of the form X t = E
P⊗m[Xαt |F
B
t ] where X
α solves (23) for a constant (i.e. FMF-
measurable) strategy α satisfying Em[α2]< ∞.
Step 0. The dynamics of the average wealth process. To solve the above problem
given (X t)t>0 it suffices to restrict ourselves to processes (X t)t>0 satisfying X t =
E
P⊗m[Xαt |F
B
t ] P⊗m-a.s.. We then have P⊗m-a.s.
X t = E
P⊗m[Xαt |F
B
t ] = E
P⊗m
[
ξ +
∫ t
0
µαds+
∫ t
0
ναdWs+
∫ t
0
σαdBs
∣∣∣FBt ]
= ξ¯ +
∫ t
0
µpisds+
∫ t
0
σpisdBs, (26)
where, for consistency of notation wrt to the previous section, we denote
ξ¯ := Em[ξ ], µα := Em[µα] and σα := Em[σα].
Hence for pi ∈ A MF and as in the previous section we can define the dynamics of
the process Zpi = Xpi −θX
dZpit =
(
µpit −θ µα
)
dt+νpitdWt +
(
σpit −θσα
)
dBt , Z
pi
0 = ξ −θξ ,
and solve the MFG Forward utility problem in Definition 4 with its help.
Hence applying Itoˆ-Wentzell toU(Zpit , t) yields
dU(Zpit , t) =Ut(Z
pi
t , t)dt+Ux(Z
pi
t , t)dZ
pi
t +
1
2
Uxx(Z
pi
t , t)d〈Z
pi
t 〉
=
[
Ut(Z
pi
t , t)+Ux(Z
pi
t , t)
(
µpit −θ µα
)
+
1
2
Uxx(Z
pi
t , t)
(
(νpit)
2+
(
σpit −θσα
)2)]
dt, (27)
+Ux(Z
pi
t , t)νpitdWt +Ux(Z
pi
t , t)
(
σpit −θσα
)
dBt ,
with U(Zpi0 ,0) =U(ξ − θξ ,0) = −exp{−(ξ − θξ)/δ} and we used that the B,W
are all i.i.d. Exact calculations on deriving (27) are presented in the Section 6.
Step 1. Finding the candidate optimal strategy pi∗.As before, the processU(Zpit , t)
becomes a Martingale at the optimum pi . Direct computations using first order con-
ditions (∂pi“drift”= 0) yield
0+Ux ·
(
µ − 0
)
+
1
2
Uxx
[
2piν2+ 2
(
σpit −θσα
)
σ
]
= 0
⇒ pi∗t (ν
2+σ2) = θσσα− µ
Ux(Z
pi
t , t)
Uxx(Z
pi
t , t)
= θσσα + µδ , (28)
where we injected the CARA constraint Ux/Uxx = −δ ∀t. By inspection it is clear
that pi∗ is a FMF0 -measurable RV which is independent of time and is well-defined
as long as σα is finite.
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Step 2. The optimality of the strategy. The argument is similar to that in [19]. The
original constant strategy α if a MF-equilibrium if and only if for all t > 0
E
P⊗m[Xαt |F
B
t ] = E
P⊗m[Xpi
∗
t |F
B
t ] a.s.
⇔ ξ¯ + µα t+σαBt = ξ¯ + µpi∗ t+σpi∗Bt a.s.
Taking expectations on both sides implies that α is a MG-equilibrium if and only if
the following two conditions holds
µα = µpi∗ and σα = σpi∗.
Using (28) withUx/Uxx =−δ and the expressions for ϕ
σ ,ψσ one derives that
σpi∗ = θ
σ2
ν2+σ2
σα + δ
µσ
ν2+σ2
⇒ σpi∗ = σαψσ +ϕσ ,
using that σα = σpi∗ yields solvability if ψσ = Em
[
θ σ
2
ν2+σ2
]
6= 1. The same proce-
dure deals with the condition µα = µpi∗. We then have
σpi∗ = σα =
ϕσ
1−ψσ
= Const, (29)
µpi∗ = µα =
ϕσ
1−ψσ
·ψ µ +ϕµ = Const. (30)
Injecting these identities in the expression for pi∗ we find (24).
For the non-solvability statement, if the equation (30) has ψσ = 1 and ϕσ 6= 0
then the equation has no solution and hence no constant MF-equilibrium exists. The
case ψσ = 1 and ϕσ = 0 is impossible. Since µ > 0 and δ > 0 by assumption, it
implies that σ = 0 and hence that ψσ = 0 contradicting the condition ψσ = 1.
Step 3. Finding the consistency SPDE and the Utility map. We do not carry out
this step explicitly, nonetheless, injecting the expression of pi∗, σα and µα in the
drift term of (27) and simplifying, we find the necessary equation (25), i.e. the con-
sistency condition the random fieldU must satisfy to that the required properties in
Definition 4 hold.
Just like in Example 2, the time-monotone forward utility equation (25) can be
solved and indeed one has a simplified version. We have
U(x, t) =−e−x/δ+tλ , (31)
where the FMF0 -measurable RV λ is given by (using (29) and (30))
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λ =−
θ
δ
µα +
1
2(ν2+σ2)
(
µ +
θ
δ
σσα
)2
−
θ 2
2δ 2
(
σα
)2
(32)
=−
θ
δ
( ϕσ
1−ψσ
·ψ µ +ϕµ − µ
σ
ν2+σ2
·
ϕσ
1−ψσ
)
+
µ2
2(ν2+σ2)
+
θ 2
2δ 2
( ϕσ
1−ψσ
)2( σ2
ν2+σ2
− 1
)
.
Step 4. The MFG forward utility dynamics. Injecting the consistency SPDE (25)
in the expression for dU(Zpit , t) given in (27) yields,
dU(Zpit , t) =
1
2
Uxx(Z
pi
t , t)
(ν2+σ2)
∣∣∣pit(ν2+σ2)−(θσ · ϕσ
1−ψσ
+ µδ
)∣∣∣2dt
+Ux(Z
pi
t , t)νpitdWt +Ux(Z
pi
t , t)
(
σpit −θ ·
ϕσ
1−ψσ
)
dBt .
We close with a corollary regarding the since common stock case.
Corollary 3 (Single stock). Let µ ,σ ,ν be deterministic with ν = 0,µ ,σ > 0. Defin-
ing constants as
ϕ := Em[δ ] and ψ := E[θ ]. (33)
Then, if ψ 6= 1 then a constant MF-equilibrium exists, with the constant optimal
strategy pi∗ given by
pi∗· =
µ
σ2
(
θ
ϕ
1−ψ
+ δ
)
.
4.4 Mean-field dynamic model selection with large horizons
Over the time interval [0,∞) our generic agent selects a sequence of horizon time
(Tj) j∈N0 (such that T0 = 0, Tj+1−Tj > 0 and lim j Tj = ∞) on which the agent as-
sesses and updates the market model by adjusting the model’s coefficients. Compar-
ing with (23) the agent models the stock as
dS
j
t
S
j
t
= µ jdt+ν jdWt +σ jdBt , STj = s j, t ∈ [Tj,Tj+1], (34)
where the index j represents the model specification at time Tj. The associated
wealth process of the generic agent is
dX
j
t = pit(µ jdt+ν jdWt +σ jdBt), XTj = ξ j, t ∈ [Tj,Tj+1].
Following the earlier constructions of this section, assume that at time T0 = 0 the
agent starts with initial utility u0(x) = −e
−x/δ . Then using the results of Theorem
2, the agent’s forward utility map is given by
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U(x, t) =−ex/δ etB0 = u0(x)e
tλ0 , t ∈ [T0,T1] = [0,T1],
where λ0 is the version of (32) for the type of the agent over the time interval [T0,T1]
and all the coefficients correspond to a type ζ0, i.e. λ (ζ0) = λ0.
λ0 = λ (ζ0) :=−
θ
δ
µα +
1
2(ν2+σ2)
(
µ +
θ
δ
σσα
)2
−
θ 2
2δ 2
(
σα
)2
. (35)
At time T1, the generic agent assesses the previous model specification and chooses
new coefficients (leading to a change in type, say from ζ0 to ζ1). The agent then
carries out the optimization program over t ∈ [T1,T2] but starting from initial utility
U(x,T1). Under the assumption of constant coefficients Theorem 2, yields,
U(x, t) =
(
u0(x)e
T1λ0
)
e(t−T1)λ1 , t ∈ [T1,T2],
where λ1 = λ (ζ1) (given by (35)) depends only on information at time T1. Quick
calculations generalize to any time horizon Tj. Assume we work on the time inter-
val [Tj,Tj+1]. Stemming from previous calculations, it is easy to see that the initial
condition for the forward utility problem is
U(x,Tj) = u0(x)
j
∏
k=1
e(Tk−Tk−1)λk−1
(with the convention that if j < 1 then ∏
j
k=1 · · ·= 0) and the MFG forward utility is
∀t ∈ [Tj,Tj+1], j > 1 and using that λ j = λ (ζ j).
U(x, t) =U(x,Tj)e
(t−Tj)λ j = u0(x)
j
∏
k=1
e(Tk−Tk−1)λk−1 · e(t−Tj)λ j ,
= u0(x)exp
{
T1(λ0−λ1)+T2(λ1−λ2)+ · · ·+Tj(λ j−1−λ j)
}
etλ j .
There are two points to highlight. Firstly, the agent needs to carry information of
what happened in the past in order to have time-consistency at present time. Sec-
ondly, this construction also allows the agents to change not just the model speci-
fication (µ ,ν,σ) but also their type including risk parameter δ and performance-
concern level θ . The initial wealth is fixed from the previous time interval.
5 Outlook and open questions
In this work we considered two optimal portfolio management problems under for-
ward utility performance concerns. We presented a simplified setting allowing for
explicit calculations of the optimal control value function, strategies and an intuitive
validation that the finite-play game reaches the mean-field game in the limit.
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This work provides a proof-of-concept for the forward mean-field utility con-
struction leaving open many questions. Generalizing the dynamics of the forward
utility (8) to a fully Itoˆ-dynamics and stochastic strategies is also open. A crucial
tool for such would be a general Itoˆ-Wenzell-Lions chain rule as developed in [9].
Such an approach would require [25], [12].
Here we addressed only the exponential-utilities (CARA) and left the power-case
(CRRA) open. Even within (8), one can build towards the CRRA case in [19] or
include the consumption problem [18]; for the general forward utility case see [10].
Also open is the so-called mean-field aggregation problem where different agents
use utility maps from different families, e.g. CRRA and CARA: [11] would be a
starting point for the finite-player case while the mean-field case would requires
the multi-class approach of [4, Section 8] with the parameterization technique of
from our Section 4. Many other questions can be posed in this context of mean-
field forward utilities, ranging from possible non-solvability [14], to risk-sharing
[5], ergodic problems [8] and associated numerics [15].
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6 Outstanding calculations
Proof (of Proposition 1). We recall the optimal strategy is given by (11), where we define
σ̂ := (piσ )
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2
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The drift of (10) becomes (we omit the argument inUt ,Ux,Uxx and use σ̂ := (piσ )
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Equation (9) now follows as U it needs to be chosen such that the equation is zero. We inject in
the drift of (10) the expression (9) and obtain a simplified version
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which results in (12).
Proof (of Equation (27)).We take up the drift of (27) and we have just by re-organizing the terms
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We recall the optimal strategy given by (28), where we complete the square inside theUxx term in
the SPDE above we have
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Under the CARA condition Ux/Uxx = −δ and the choice of the optimal strategy, the remaining
drift must zero-out. We then have
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